

# CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

## 1. SITUATION

### 1.1 *General*

#### 1.1.1 General Situation

- Three newly independent countries (BLUE, YELLOW, ORANGE) of similar size :
  - Weak state structure,
  - Weak central government,
  - ORANGE is more stable and developed.
- BLUE and YELLOW share « GREEN » area which has been contested for a long time and while a GREEN minority is claiming autonomy.
- 1975 : oil is discovered in the GREEN province.
- ORANGE has a modern maritime access.
- With the oil extraction, BLUE and YELLOW need to closely monitor the GREEN area despite the wish of GREEN for autonomy.
- In order to confront these two countries, the GREEN minority creates the PIVERT, and its military wing, Force de liberté (FL).
- ORANGE supports PIVERT in order to benefit from the oil extraction in GREEN.
- In July 2003, BLUE and YELLOW intervene in the GREEN province in order to monitor it, but there is no decisive military victory. Some BLUE and YELLOW hard-liners appeared, leading to disturbances, exodus of the population from GREEN to ORANGE and the evacuation of foreign oil experts. The oil installations are left almost abandoned, except for some sensitive sites.
- Subsequent to this economic, political and humanitarian collapse, the UN Security Council decided to mandate ECOWAS to implement a Peace Agreement signed between BLUE, ORANGE, YELLOW and PIVERT.
- In the GREEN province, the GREEN rebels reject the agreement and threaten to destroy the oil installations and to create a new flow of refugees.

#### 1.1.2 Current Situation

At the request of ECOWAS, a new resolution of the Security Council is adopted on 21 May, 2004 in order to :

- Recall the previous resolution condemning the conflict,
- Renew for 6 months the embargo on weapons,
- Authorize for 6 months the deployment of an ECOWAS multinational force in GREEN province in order to :
  - Ø to impose the cease fire (under chapter VII),
  - Ø to reassure the population,
  - Ø to facilitate the sending of humanitarian assistance and the work of the United Nations staff,
  - Ø to monitor the enforcement of the arms embargo,
  - Ø to re-establish security and stability in the area in order to assist the governments of YELLOW and BLUE to provide enough political representation to the GREEN minority and to implement necessary measures that allow the exploitation and the transportation of the oil in ORANGE country.

- Ask the UNSG to examine the situation in two months with the aim of the possible establishment of a follow-on force other than ECOWAS.

### 1.1.3 Disposition of Forces

- Blue Forces
  - ARMY
  - 1 Brigade HQ in Savalou
  - 2 motorised infantry battalions : Atakpame, Abomey, Savalou
  - 1 mechanised infantry battalion
  - AIR FORCE : 2 planes and 2 helicopters for transportation tasks
  - BLUE Forces are expected to co-operate with the ECOWAS Force.
- Yellow Forces
  - ARMY
  - 3 motorised infantry battalions : Porto-Novo, Hizan-Kogede, Ola.
  - 1 mechanised infantry battalion : Porto-Novo
  - 1 Special Forces unit : Hizan-Kogede
  - ARMY AVIATION (AA) : only for transportation and presidential flights
  - NAVY : 2 patrol boats lightly armed
  - YELLOW Forces are expected to co-operate with the ECOWAS Force.
- Orange Forces
  - ARMY
  - HQ : Cotonou
  - 2 motorized infantry battalions
  - 1 mechanized infantry battalion
  - NATIONAL GUARD : 1 infantry battalion, 1 SF section.
  - NAVY : 1 Navy SEAL unit, 3 maritime patrol boats
  - AIR FORCE : 3 "Ecureuil" helicopters, 1 Falcon 20, 1 AN26
  - ORANGE Forces are expected to co-operate with the ECOWAS Force.
- Green Forces : « Force de Liberté (FL) »
  - no permanent military base.
  - Located in and around Abomey-Bohicon conurbation
  - 6,000 armed fighters
  - 4 ZSU 23-4 guns mounted on Toyota Land Cruisers.
  - FL guerrilla actions rarely involve more than 6 to 10 fighters at any one time, but there is the potential for larger forces up to possibly 100 fighters when required.

- Militias
  - GREEN : even if PIVERT signed the Peace Agreement, some uncontrolled GREEN militia Forces could harass the ECOWAS Forces, either directly or by destroying some oil installations. This could occur during the deployment of the ECOWAS Force or after. A war of attrition could also be waged against the Force, the people, the foreign oil experts and the oil installations.
  - BLUE and YELLOW militias : some BLUE and/or YELLOW hard-liners could threaten the peace process by attacking the GREEN minority which would increase the flow of refugees to ORANGE. This could delay the ECOWAS Force deployment and further reduce the population of the GREEN minority.

## **1.2 Political directives**

### 1.2.1 Political objectives

The ECOWAS states taking into account Resolution 5002 (21 May 2004) and the dramatic events taking place in the GREEN Province, decide to deploy peace enforcement forces (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to restore peace and stability in the entire territory of BLUE, YELLOW and ORANGE, particularly in the GREEN Province, in order to allow the implementation of the protocols of the Peace Agreement of 13 Nov 2003

### 1.2.2 Strategic Option

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and referring to the AU Charter, in order to implement the Mandate given by the UN Resolution number 5002 , deploy as soon as possible an ECOWAS multinational force for a six month period in GREEN and its surroundings in order to restore peace and stability.

### 1.2.3 End State

Political : Stable and Secure environment is established in the tri-border area adequate for the consolidation of peace.

Military :

## **1.3 Risk assessment**

### Risk assessment

Risk assessment involves identifying some variables that may impair the operation

- 1 The HN governments may withdraw their support for the ECOWAS operation after the operation has started
- 2 PIVERT may wage guerrilla warfare against ECOWAS forces
- 3 Some ECOWAS nations may withdraw their support for the operation
- 4 Landmines in the GREEN area
- 5 Infiltration of refugees by militias
- 6 Possible ambush of humanitarian relief materials
- 7 Possible delay in deployment of UN forces after 6 months of ECOWAS operation

8 Possible discrediting of ECOWAS actions by PIVERT

9 Sabotage risk along communication axis from APOD/SPOD to GREEN

### Critical Information Requirements

- a. Locations and size of the warring parties.
- b. Locations and management of refugees.
- c. How to establish contacts with BLUE and YELLOW forces
- d. How to establish contacts with NGOs/IOs

### **1.4 Assumptions**

For planning purposes, the “ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission” makes the following assumptions:

- (1) No external power would interfere in the crisis.
- (2) Blue, Yellow and Orange would allow the deployment of the ECOWAS force.
- (3) Political will of the international community to resolve the crisis

### **1.5 Key military tasks**

#### 1.5.1 Operational tasks

- To provide intelligence
- To train the Force
- To project and to deploy openly the Force using existing infrastructure
- To establish a multinational military presence in the zone of the 3 borders able to neutralize any attempt of aggression against the ECOWAS Force.
- To prevent any resumption of hostilities.
- To be ready to confront any aggression from any of the militia from BLUE, GREEN or YELLOW.
- To reinforce the embargo on weapons.
- To establish the joint commissions at the necessary levels.
- To provide a safe environment, suitable to the IOs and NGOs for the return of refugees and displaced persons.
- To establish and maintain a cordial relationship with the top representatives of the UN, the various organizations and agencies in order to guarantee concurrent military and civil activities in the theatre of operations.
- To create the conditions for a possible NEO (Non-combatant Evacuation Operation).
- To facilitate the implementation of the DDRRR by UN
- To disengage the Force after 6 months to allow a UN force deployment
- To return to home establishment

#### 1.5.2 Support tasks

- To prepare the Force

- To project the Force
- To built up a logistic organisation in order to support the Force
- To provide logistic support during Force disengagement
- To re-deploy

### 1.5.3 CIMIC tasks

#### 1.5.3.1 Tasks with the profit of the force

Facilitate preparation and execution of the forces deployment:

- To get information (resources, sedentary situation, attitudes of the local authorities),
- To establish the local contacts and arrangements (to facilitate precursory elements work),
- To evaluate the constraints imposed by the Force deployment.

Support the military operations (propaganda).

#### 1.5.3.2 Tasks with the profit of the civil environment

Evaluate the civil environment:

- To evaluate the socio-economic situation on the theatre of the operations,
- To make an inventory of the needs for the local government and the populations,
- To identify the mobilizable resources.

Contribute to the re-establishment of the rule of law.

To take part in the restarting of the economic life.

#### 1.5.3.3 Tasks of humane nature

Help the populations

Support of the humane organisations

## **2 MISSION**

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, an ECOWAS Multinational Force is to deploy into GREEN and its surroundings as soon as possible for 6 months to provide security to the population, control the oil installations, stabilize and secure the GREEN area in order to create the conditions for a return to peace.

## **3 EXECUTION**

### **3.1 *Commander's Intent***

In order that peace is established in the area of the three borders, my intention is to interpose a multinational force between the various factions, control in particular, Yellow, Green and the Bleu militia and continually secure the logistic corridors against guerrilla actions.

## **3.2 Course Of Action**

### 3.2.1 General idea

Deployment of one Intervention force in conflict area

- Insert the force By Air/sea/Land in the FOB in Orange
- Rapid deployment into Green in order to :
  - Set up base camps in sectors
  - Enforce the Cease fire
  - Regain control of oil installations
  - Establish Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and prepare DDRRR
- Impose Arms Embargo (Sea/Land)
- Assist NGOs/IOs in humanitarian activities
- Transition to UN operation
- Exit strategy

### 3.2.2 Phasing

#### **Preliminary phase**

- Preparation and formation in each country of the participating units.
- Regrouping and installation of the force in Orange south, under responsibility of the framework nation (Benin)
- Information gathering on the belligerents
- Information campaign on the deployment of the force
- TOA

This phase should be completed by D-3

#### Phase 1: Deployment

- To rapidly deploy the force in Green.
- To establish liaisons with the parties to the conflict
- To establish and secure the logistic and humanitarian corridors

Duration of the phase: D-Day to D+7

#### Phase 2: Conduct of the operations

- To provide security for the population.
- To impose cease-fire.
- To secure the oil installations.
- To establish a demilitarized zone.
- To impose and enforce an arms embargo .
- To provide security for humanitarian aid

Duration of this phase: D+7 to D+180

#### Phase 3: Transition and transfer to the UN force

Duration of this phase: D+160 to D+180

#### Phase 4: Withdrawal

Duration of this phase: D+170 to D+190

### 3.2.3 Forces required

- **INTERARMEES:**

- 1 SECTION DE FORCES DE RECONNAISSANCE :
  - Ø **BENIN** 1 section
  - Ø **TOGO** 1 groupe
  - Ø **NIGERIA** 1 section
- 1 COMPAGNIE MEDICALE NIVEAU 2:
  - **COTE D IVOIRE** totalité
- 1 COMPAGNIE DE POLICE MILITAIRE/GENDARMERIE :
  - Ø **GUINEE** 1 section
  - Ø **MALI** 1 section
  - Ø **TOGO** 1 section
  - Ø **GHANA** 1 section
  - Ø **NIGERIA** 1 section
- 1 SECTION D 'OFFICIERS DE LIAISON (15)
  - Ø **TOUS LES PAYS CEDEAO**
- 1 ETAT MAJOR DE FORCE INTERARMEES
  - Ø **BENIN noyau dur complété par 14 autres membres CEDEAO**
- 1 COMPAGNIE LOGISTIQUE RENFORCEE
  - Ø **BENIN** 1 section de transport divers
  - Ø **COTE D IVOIRE** 1 section de transport divers
- 1 COMPAGNIE D 'INFANTERIE DE RESERVE DE THEATRE (BLINDEE Leger + MORTIER)
  - Ø **NIGERIA**
  - Ø **GUINEE (élément de liaison)**
- 1 Batterie d 'Artillerie lourde de réserve de théâtre
  - **GUINEE (élément de liaison NIGERIA)**
- 1 COMPAGNIE DE GENIE AIDE AU DEPLOIEMENT/STATIONNEMENT
  - Ø **BENIN** 1 compagnie
  - Ø **SENEGAL** 1 compagnie
  - Ø **NIGERIA** 1 compagnie
- 1 COMPAGNIE DE TRANSMISSION
  - Ø **BENIN noyau dur complété par 14 autres membres CEDEAO**

- **TERRE:**

- 1 ETAT-MAJOR DE COMPOSANTE : NIGERIA (CADRE) + RENFORTS PAYS CONTRIBUTEURS
- 2 BATAILLONS D 'INFANTERIE
  - Ø **MALI** 1 PC de Bataillon + renforts pays contributeurs (**GUINEE, TOGO, BENIN**)
  - Ø **NIGER** 1 PC de bataillon + Renforts pays contributeurs (**Cote d ivoire, Burkina**)
  - Ø **GUINEE** 1 compagnie motorisée
  - Ø **MALI** 1 compagnie motorisée
  - Ø **TOGO** 1 Compagnie aéroportée
  - Ø **GHANA** 1 Combat team (compagnie mixte renforcée)
  - Ø **BENIN** 1 compagnie motorisée
  - Ø **NIGERIA** 1 bataillon mixte + PC organique + TACON GHANA
  - Ø **NIGER** 1 Compagnie motorisée
  - Ø **COTE D IVOIRE** 1 Compagnie motorisée
  - Ø **BURKINA FASO** 1 section motorisée
- 1 COMPAGNIE DE GENIE COMBAT
  - Ø **BENIN** 1 section déminage
  - Ø **SENEGAL** 1 section Aide à la mobilité + Commandement + Off liaison contributeurs
  - Ø **NIGERIA** 1 section franchissement
  - Ø **SIERRA LEONE** 1 section déminage

- **AIR:**

- PC DE COMPOSANTE : NIGERIA (CADRE) + RENFORTS PAYS PARTICIPANTS

- 3 HELICOPTERES DE RECONAISSANCE
  - Ø BENIN 1
  - Ø NIGERIA 1
  - Ø BURKINA FASO 1
- 3 HELICOPTERES DE SOUTIEN
  - Ø NIGERIA 1
  - Ø COTE D IVOIRE 1
  - Ø NIGER 1
- 2 C 130
  - Ø NIGERIA 1
  - Ø NIGER 1
- **MER:**
  - PC DE COMPOSANTE : GUINEE + RENFORTS PAYS CONTRIBUTEURS
  - 4 PATROUILLEURS
    - Ø TOGO 1
    - Ø GUINEE 1
    - Ø GHANA 1
    - Ø NIGERIA 1
  - 1 COMPAGNIE DE FUSILLIERS COMMANDOS
    - Ø TOGO 1 groupe
    - Ø COTE D IVOIRE 1 section
    - Ø BENIN 1 groupe
    - Ø CAP VERT 1 section + Commandement de compagnie + renforts contributeurs

### **3.3 Co-ordinating instructions**

#### **3.3.1 Legal aspects**

The intervention of the ECOWAS Force will be carried out in conformity with the standards of International Law, particularly those of the rights of armed conflicts and the International Humanitarian Law (Appendix AA of the OPLAN).

The Force will abide by the domestic laws of the host country.

The deployment of the Force will be preceded by the adoption of the Status of the Forces Agreements (SOFA) and on the conditions of support between the troop contributing countries (TCCs) and the host nation (HN).

#### **3.3.2 Rules Of Engagement (ROE), Rules Of Behaviour**

Robust and comprehensive ROEs will be issued in Appendix E of the OPLAN, in order to insure force protection and to enable the Force to carry out its mission in all circumstances.

Nothing shall negate the Force Commander's or any individual's rights and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action to ensure individual self defence and unit security.

The details relating to the legal aspects and ROEs are contained in the appendix 2 to this CONOPS.

### 3.3.3 Liaison with BLUE, YELLOW and GREEN forces

Exchange of liaison teams with the forces of Orange, Yellow, Blue and the Green PIVERT

### 3.3.4 Directives for SOPs

Use RECAMP IV planning process as basis for drafting ECOWAS Strategic SOPs  
Requirement For operational level SOPs

### 3.3.5 Directives for linguistic policy

All documents written at the strategic, operational and component levels will be in French and English. Verbal instructions will not be translated.

### 3.3.6 Joint coordination between the components

Joint Operational Area (JOA) will be proposed ASP by the Force Commander.  
A daily joint operational situation brief will be presented at the TFHQ.

## 4 Support organisation

### 4.1 Objective

### 4.2 Organisation & Command

#### 4.2.1 Logistic Layout

The Global Joint Logistic organisation will include the following layout :

- A Joint Theater Logistic Base stationed in COTONOU
- A forward logistic site to be determined by the Force Commander

#### 4.2.2 General principles

In relation with the designated logistician of the ECOWAS executive secretariat :

- POL & Medical Support for the 3 components, Land, Air & Navy, will be centrally managed by the force commander
- A Joint Logistic Unit will provide general support, 2<sup>nd</sup> line, to the force.
- The tactical units deployed by ECOWAS countries will be logistically self sufficient (1<sup>st</sup> Line)

#### 4.2.3 Command relationship

- The Logistic Command relationship will follow the ECOWAS permanent logistic directive
- A theater support commander will be nominated. He will report to ECOWAS, through Force Commander, on the use of the resources made available to the Force.

### 4.3 Level of resources to be kept

#### 4.3.1 Theater security stock

- At theater level the Force will detain a security stock equivalent to 90 Days of engagement

#### 4.3.2 Land component Autonomy and Resources

- The Land Component initial autonomy is fixed at 30 days in the forward logistic site and 10 days at the operational unit level

#### 4.3.3 Navy component Autonomy and Resources

- The Navy Component initial autonomy is fixed at 15 days.

#### 4.3.4 Air component Autonomy and Resources

- The Air Component initial autonomy is fixed at 15 days.

### 4.4 Service Support organisation

#### 4.4.1 Movements – Transportation - Transit

- Strategic transportation is a national responsibility. Nevertheless, through the ECOWAS executive secretariat, a collective use of the available assets will be encouraged. Eventually, outside contributions could be requested.
- Intra-theater movements will be performed by Road, Rail or Air means. Civilian contracting is possible through ECOWAS.

#### 4.4.2 POL

- POL support will be centralised by the POL cell in the Theater Support Commander.
- Local resources will be the preferred source of supply.

#### 4.4.3 Maintenance

- Maintenance is a national responsibility
- Nevertheless, 2nd level maintenance assets could be centralized in a multinational unit, deployed in the Theater Logistic area.
- Level 1 maintenance will be performed directly in the operational units

#### 4.4.4 MEDICAL

##### 4.4.4.1 Principles

- Medical Preparation before deployment (vaccination)
- Combat losses are estimated at about 1% in case of armed confrontation
- Level 1 medical support is a national responsibility
- Level 2 et 3 medical support will be provided by a single country, deployed in a local hospital in Orange country, in COTONOU

#### 4.4.4.2 Medical Evacuations

- Role 4 MEDEVAC is a national responsibility. They will be performed through the designated Theater SPOE & APOE.

#### 4.4.5 Life support – Administration - Finance


##### 4.4.5.1 Life support

Food & Water : Food supply for the whole Force will be performed in a centralized matter by the Theater Logistic Unit. Fresh products will be bought on the local market. The security stocks will solely be composed of MREs (90 days)

##### 4.4.5.2 Administration – finances

- A financial repartition key will be determined by ECOWAS. It will establish the reimbursement modalities between the contributors (Food, POL, Per Diem, common spending)
- The Force Commander will be responsible for the expenses made on the common budget allocated to the Force. He will regularly report to ECOWAS on the status of the budget.
- Payment of salaries is a national responsibility.
- Requisition are strictly forbidden

#### 4.5 Command organisation chart



## 5 CIMIC

See Annexe CIMIC

## 6 CONTINGENCY PLANS

- Strategic reserve
- Force extraction
- NEO : Non-combattant Extraction Operation
- Relief BY UN Force