RECAMP IV Cycle

Benin 2004 Exercise

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Last update on January 1, 1970, 1:00 am

RECAMP IV exercise synopsis

Summary

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The synopsis of RECAMP IV exercise can be downloaded by clicking on one of the following links:

Purposes of the scenario

The scenario described below is for use to support the politico-military planning process at the seminar of Accra. It aims to permit exchanges between civil and military high officials at the strategic level, then to facilitate a multinational and joint planning based on a simple and realistic scenario involving all the constituent elements of a modern crisis: territorial claims, irredentism, quarrels of interest, problems of sharing of resources, illicit trafficking, arms dealings, irregular fighters and mercenaries, children soldiers, humanitarian problems.
The scenario also aims to allow the play of the IO / NGO in cooperation with the deployed force.

A map of the fictitious zone of the scenario appears as an appendix.

A. THE CONTEXT.

  1. Three countries in western Africa: BLUE (capital Savalou), ORANGE (capital Cotonou), YELLOW (capital Porto-Novo) of similar size..
  2. BLUE, ORANGE, YELLOW have fragile state structures.
  3. ORANGE is however more stable and developed than BLUE and YELLOW (in particular no domestic ethnic problem).
  4. BLUE and YELLOW have a multiethnic population and each possesses since the decolonization a part of a province called GREEN (traditional administrative center Abomey). This cross-border region is populated with the same ethnic GREEN minority which has established ethnic solidarity on both sides of the border and desires to set up a self-government of the province. The ultimate aim of the GREEN minority is autonomy from BLUE and YELLOW.
  5. ORANGE has a modern access to the sea (deep water harbour).
  6. For YELLOW, without a main harbour, the access to the sea through the lagoons is difficult, but not impossible.

B. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS.

  1. BLUE and YELLOW begin to exploit the region, foreign experts arrive and build important oil installations. In order to better control the zone to exploit these resources, BLUE and YELLOW intend to fight against the GREEN irredentism, if necessary by expelling the ethnic GREEN minority from the zone.
  2. Anticipating a potential crisis , the CICR and the HCR send a delegation to the capitals of the BLUE and YELLOW countries.
  3. ORANGE, which has a modern access to the sea, is particularly interested in these resources which they could exploit and export once ORANGE controlled them. ORANGE supports the ethnic minority of GREEN against the offensive desires of BLUE and YELLOW. Their objective is to strengthen as much as possible their influence on the GREEN region.
  4. GREEN sees its identity and the beginnings of its autonomy being threatened. The armed branch of the PIVERT (independent green party) starts an armed confrontation to resist to the pressure of the BLUE and YELLOW central governments and to obtain the political recognition as pivotal regional actor. The armed branch of the PIVERT is lacks weapons and is therefore looking for support from ORANGE.
  5. In face of the imminent conflict in GREEN region, the CICR decides to send to Abomey a sub-delegation of the delegation already deployed in BLUE; at the same time, the HCR also opens an agency in Abomey.
  6. ORANGE, without engaging openly in the crisis, initially shows sympathies for the PIVERT and does not attempt to stop the arms traffic supporting PIVERT which runs along different lines of communication on their territory (lagoons).

C. THE CRISIS.

  1. JULY, 2003: BLUE and YELLOW send their armies, with modest means, to fight the GREEN rebels. It is war, but there is no decisive military advance and no likely winner due to the weakness of the capabilities of all the belligerent which are forced to employ mercenaries and even child soldiers. This situation provokes the appearance of armed extremists (radical dissident troops) in BLUE and YELLOW countries who arm themselves and commit exactions in concert with the actions of BLUE and YELLOW regular troops. These extremists, at first tolerated by BLUE and YELLOW, become uncontrollable and begin acting for their own account.
  2. The civil population of GREEN province and surroundings takes refuge on the territory of ORANGE which has insufficient resources to ensure their survival and is consequently destabilized : humanitarian disaster, famines and epidemics.
  3. The foreign experts in GREEN region feel threatened, the majority are evacuated. The oil installations are left almost abandoned, with the exception of some technical surveillance teams supervised by the remaining foreign experts.

D. TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

  1. BLUE and YELLOW are weakened.
  2. ORANGE, destabilized and having lost its credibility by the consequences of the war in GREEN, is interested in quickly resolving the crisis.
  3. GREEN has lost many people and is afraid of a genocide by the radical dissident troops of BLUE and YELLOW.
  4. The oil industry worries about its future.

At this stage in the crisis, all the parties have an interest in signing a peace agreement.

  1. An attempt of mediation of certain ECOWAS member states fails.
  2. The ECOWAS "mediation and security council" decides to call on the Security Council of the United Nations.
  3. The international community denounces the humanitarian disaster and prepares to respond.
  4. The UN Security Council meets on September 13th, 2003 and votes for a resolution:
    • condemning the armed exactions,
    • establishing, for six months, an embargo on weapons to the GREEN fighters and the BLUE, ORANGE and YELLOW national armed forces,
    • appointing a special representative of the UNSG to help the parties to conclude a peace agreement.
  5. Appointment by the AU of a special representative tasked to follow the evolution of the crisis.
  6. Appointment by the EU of a special representative tasked to follow closely the crisis and to propose ways of action for the EU.
  7. Deployment of NGOs and United Nations specialised agencies (HCR, HCHR, UNOCHA) in the zone of crisis.

E. THE PEACE AGREEMENT.

  1. November 13, 2003, under the aegis of the ECOWAS and the auspices of the UN, a peace agreement between BLUE, ORANGE, and YELLOW is signed establishing:
    • a cease fire between all forces involved,
    • the disarmament of the GREEN rebels and the other irregular fighters (the BLUE and YELLOW radical dissident troops, the mercenaries and the child soldiers),
    • a better representation of the GREEN minority in the BLUE and YELLOW, governments,
    • an agreement on the oil exploitation of resources in GREEN : security of oil installations, royalties for ORANGE which will insure the transit by the passage of an oil pipeline on its territory,
    • deployment in GREEN of a multinational stabilization force in order to verify the cease fire agreement and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the combatants,
    • the Security Council congratulates the parties on this agreement by a presidential statement.

F. THE PROBLEM OF THE GREEN REGION.

  1. In the GREEN province, the leader of the Independent party (PIVERT) refuses to apply the agreements of peace signed by BLUE, ORANGE and YELLOW. The armed branch of the PIV resumes guerrilla warfare, generating a resumption of refugees streaming from GREEN towards ORANGE. In addition, the PIV threatens the oil installations.

G. THE EXIT OF CRISIS.

  1. At the request of the ECOWAS, a new resolution of the Security Council is adopted on May 21, 2004:
    • Recalling the previous resolution condemning conflict,
    • Welcoming the peace agreement,
    • Renewing for 6 months the embargo on weapons,
    • Authorizing for 6 months the deployment of an ECOWAS multinational force in GREEN province, in view of the evolution of the humanitarian situation since the previous resolution, in order:
      • to impose the cease fire (action under chapter VII),
      • to reassure the populous,
      • to facilitate the sending of the humanitarian assistance and the work of the United Nations staff present on the spot,
      • to monitor the application of the arms embargo,
      • to contribute to the enforcement and to the preservation of security until the BLUE and YELLOW governments reorganise and provide more representation to the GREEN minority and until the implementation of necessary measures that allow the exploitation and the transport of the oil in BLUE, ORANGE and YELLOW countries.
    • Congratulating itself on the appointment by the Secretary General of his special representative for the GREEN region, charged to coordinate the action of the UN agencies displayed on the ground (PNUD, HCR, HCDH),
    • Congratulating itself on the implication of the AU in the management of the crisis,
    • Asking the UNSG to examine the situation in two months with the aim of the possible establishment of a follow-on force other than ECOWAS.

H. ECOWAS TASKED TO IMPLEMENT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

  1. On May 24, 2004 the ECOWAS "defence and security committee" begins planning of the operation. A " strategic planning group " is formed by officers of the ECOWAS countries.
  2. On June 07, 2004 the ECOWAS "defence and security committee" approves the Strategic Concept.
  3. December, 2004 : force deployment and beginning of the ECOWAS multinational operation.

I. MILITARY PURPOSE.

  1. To protect the population by putting an end to the exactions of various factions, to resume the control of oil installations, and by doing so, to stabilise the GREEN region and create the conditions for the resolution of the crisis.

J. CRISIS RESOLUTION.

  1. The Security Council could decide to create a multidimensional operation:
    • Comprising a " civilian police " element,
    • Deploying military observers to monitor violations of the cease fire,
    • Assist the implementation of the economic structures necessary for the oil exploitation as well as stable political structures,
    • Facilitate the return of the refugees to their region of origin.
  2. EU political and financial involvement in the post-crisis management.

Appendix : Map of the fictitious zone of RECAMP IV scenario.

 

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